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PERFORMANCE PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY
ABSTRACT
What happens when a firm switches from paying hourly wages to paying piece rates? The
theory developed below predicts that average productivity rises, that the firm will attract a more able
work force and that the variance in output across individuals at the firm will rise as well. The theory
is tested with data from a large autoglass company that changed compensation structures between
1994 and 1995. All theoretical predictions are borne out. In the firm examined, the productivity
effects are extremely large, amounting to anywhere from about 20% to 36% of output, depending
on what is held constant. About half of the worker-specific increase in productivity is passed on to
workers in the form of higher wages.
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
and NBERMany believe that an easy way to increase productivity in an organkation is to pay on the
basis of measured performance. Of course, there are some difficulties associated with performance
pay schemes that have been pointed out in the literature. 1 There have been few attempts to examine
the choice of payment scheme and its effect on output.2 In large part, the lack of literature is a direct
result of a lack of data. It is difficult to fmd situations where some workers are paid on the basis of
performance and other workers are paid according to some other scheme, coupled with the condition
that the comparisons do not *O involve a number of other factors that vary across the groups, The
analysis in this paper does not suffer from the traditional problem. It is based on data from a large
autoglass company named Safelite Glass Corporation. During 1994 and 1995, after the introduction
of new management, the company gradually changed the compensation method for its work force,
moving them from hourly wages to piece rate pay. The effects, which are documented below, were
dramatic and completely in line with economic theory.
In what follows, the theory of piece rate compensation is sketched with particular emphasis
on the predictions that pertain to changes in the compensation method. The theory is backed up by
the empirical results, the most important of which are:
1. A switch to piece rate pay has a sigtilcant effect on average levels of output. This is in
the range of a 36% gain.
‘See Lazear (1986) for a detailed discussion of when to pay a piece rate, which is defined to be payment on the
basis of output, Also, Fama (1991) discusses other reasons for paying on the basis of some measured time interval.
Baker (1992) discusses the difi]culties created by pay-for-performance structures when measurement is a problem. A
very early discussion of the incentive effects of piece rates can be found in Slichter (1928), Ch. 13.
2A notable exception is Brown (1992). Some have looked at the effects of compensation in the sports world.
Most recently, Fernie and Metcalf (1996) find that when payment is contingent on performance, jockeys better
performance than when payment is unrelated to performance. Also, Parsch and Shearer (1996) find that tree planters in
British Columbia produce higher levels of output when paid on piece rate, but that they fatigue more rapidly.
12. The gain can k split into two components. More than half of the increase in productivity
results from the average worker producing more because of incentive effects. Some results from a
reduction in turnover among the most productive workers and
workers. None reflects the “Hawthorne effect. ”
3. Productivity gains show up in a number of ways. In
an ability to hire the most productive
addition to an increase in the number
of pieces produced in a given day and altering turnover, moving to pay for performance implies
reductions in absenteeism.
4. The f~m shares the gains in productivity with its workforce. For a given worker, about
half of the worker-specific increased productivity is captured by the worker.
5. Moving to piece rate pay increases the variance in output. More ambitious workers have
less incentive to differentiate themselves when hourly wages are paid than when piece rate pay is
used. Also, the variance in underlying ability rises because the most able workers are attracted by the
piece rate.
The evidence implies that the choice of compensation method is important, not that piece rates
are good. In equilibrium, f~rns choose a compensation method, based on the costs and benefits of
the various schemes. Firms that continue to pay hourly wages must, in equilibrium, fmd that benefits
of paying an hourly wage, such as low monitoring costs and perhaps higher quality output, outweigh
the costs in the form of lower output.
Some conclusions are unambiguous. Workers respond to prices just as economic theory
predicts. Claims by sociologists and others that monetizing incentives may actually reduce output
are unambiguously refuted by the data. Not only do the effects back up economic predictions, but
the effects are extremely large and precisely in line with theory.
2The evidence allows somewhat broader interpretation. It is often difficult to obtain actual
data on consumers and their reactions to changes in prices. Tests of even the most basic tenets of
economic theory are dfilcult to perform, at least at a micro level. These data we well-suited to that
purpose. While expertints bear out the basic response of economic agents to prices, the data used
in this paper come from the real world, rather than a laborato~ setting. Compensation, which reflects
the most important price that a consumer faces, truly matters to the workers in this setting, and they
respond accordingly.
Modeling Choice of Pay Scheme: Hourly Wages versus Piece Rates
The primary motivation behind instituting a piece rate scheme is to increase worker effort.
While it may seem obvious that moving from hourly wages to piece rates would increase effort, it is
not. When a fwm institutes an hourly wage schedule, it usually couples the payment with some
minimum level of output that is acceptable. It is possible, therefore, that the minimum acceptable
output chosen for hourly wage workers exceeds the level of output that workers voluntarily choose
under a piece rate. Further, it maybe that the minimum level chosen under hourly wages is so high
that ordy the most able workers can make the cut. When piece rates are instituted, more
heterogeneityy might be tolerated, resulting in lower average levels of output.
In some sense, the term “performance pay” is not very useful. Even if we restrict performance
pay to refer to pay based on output (rather than input), a broad set of compensation schemes are
included. Hourly wages that are coupled with some minimum standard could be called performance
pay, because a performance standard must be met to retain employment. In fact, were workers
homogeneous, an hourly wage structure with a minimum number of units tolerated per hour canachieve the efficient outcome.’
Given that workers differ in their talent, ambition, or willingness to trade time for money, it
is necessary to derive the optimal minimum standard under hourly wages in a more general context.
The resulting levels of output and the distribution of worker abilities is then compared with that
which is expected to result under the piece rate scheme that was chosen by Safelite.
Begin, then, by defining e to be the output level chosen by a worker, which is a function of
underlying abtity, A, and of effort choice. Let A - g(A) with distribution function G(A). The activity
in question in the empirically analysis, specifically, the installation of glass into automobiles, is easily
monitored. Thus, suppose that the f~m can observe e,
Hourly Wages
The firm that pays an hourly wage can specify some minimally acceptable level of output per
hour eO. The fum fies workers whose output falls consistently below eO. Commensurate with that
level of required output is some wage, W, that the f~m offers. The worker’s utility finction is given
by
(1) C(e)
Utility = Income - —
A
where C(e) is the homogeneous part of the cost function with C‘, C“>CJ . Since A measures ability,
individuals with higher levels of ability have lower costs of producing any given level of output, e.4
‘To do this, simply solve for the efficient level of effort per hour which sets tie marginal cost of effort equal to
the marginal value of effort. Require that level of effort as the minimum standard for the job. Then, set the hourly wage
just high enough to attract workers to the firm.
4The words “ output” and “effort are used interchangeably. It is always possible to redetine C(e) such that one
unit of effort, say measured in calories burned, produces one unit of output.
4As mentioned above, were workers homogeneous and output or effort observable, it would
be straightforward to implement the efficient level of effort using hourly wages and an output
requirement. Given the utility function in (1), the efficient level of output is e*, such that
C’(e*)/A = 1
because the marginal value of a unit of output is normalized to be 1. The f~m could simply require
that workers produce at least e*. Then the f~m would set the wage, W, such that
so that
W = C(e*) /A
workers would be willing to work.
Workers are heterogeneous and this makes the problem more dtilcult for the f~m. The
problem is that the standard and wage that is right for one group of workers is not right for another
group. Thus, the f~m must choose a standard and wage that is the best compromise. The problem
is solved as follows:
For any given pair of required output and wage, (eO,~, there is a group of workers who will
accept the job. SpecKlcally, only those with sufficiently high ability such that
W> C(eO)/A
accept the job. The minimum ability individual who will accept a job that requires eOof output to
be produced is& such that
(2) W = C(eO)/AO.
Suppose that the firm receives a given number of job applications in any period. Then the fwm
wants to maximize expected profits, taking into account that a high wage is more likely to attract
workers, but that a low wage yields higher profit on any given worker. It is not obvious that effort
5is low in an hourly wage fum because it is possible that the firm may choose to specify a level of eO
that exceeds the level chosen in the piece rate problem. Of course, requiring a higher eOimplies that
the f~m must pay a higher Wto attract any given worker.
All workers with ability levels that exceed AO earn rents because they are required only to
produce eOof output and the pain associated with producing it is lower than the pain for individuals
with ability AO, who are just indifferent between working and not. However, because there is
competition horn other f~ms in this industry and others, a worker must compare the rents earned at
this f~m with those earned elsewhere.
Define R(A) as the rent that a worker of ability A can expect to receive elsewhere, with
R ‘(A) >0 because higher ability workers can always do what a lower ability worker can do elsewhere
and do it with less pain, Thus, workers who have R(A) >W - C(eO)/A will choose to work
ekewhere. Thus, for any wage policy Wand work requirement eO,there is a group of workers who
wiUwork at the fwm. Since all receive the same wage, all choose to produce at the minimum level
of output, eO. Those willing to work have ability greater than AO, but less than Ah, where Ah
solves
(3) W- C(e,,)/Ah =R(Ah).






Ability is shown on the horizontal ah. As rises, W- C(eO)/A rises because higher ability
individuals produce output eOat less cost. Both AO and Ah are defined as in (2) and (3),
respectively. In fig. 1, R(A) is shown to cross W – C(eO)/A. This is reasonable since more able
workers do not earn higher wages under the straight hourly wage scheme. Every worker earns Wand
produces eO. The ordy reason that rents are higher on the current job for higher ability workers is
that the more able accomplish the task more easily. But other fums need not constrain all workers
to earn the same amount. It is for this
however, that R(A) would never cross
workers with A >AOwould work at
reason that R(A) is steeper than W- C(eO)/A. (It is possible,
W- C(eO)/A. If opportunities outside are sufficiently bad, all
this f~m and Ah = m). AU workers with ability A, such that
7AO<A<Ah,
choose to work at the fum.5
The problem for the fm is to choose W’and e& The f~m wants to choose a lower W for any
given level of output, but this will affect the number of individuals who are willing to work on this
job. Similarly, the firm would like to set the minimum output standard as high as possible. But for
any given W, higher required levels of output mean that fewer workers are willing to take the job.
The maximization problem for the f~m can be written formally as
Ah
(4) Max ~(eO - ~ g(A)dA
eO,W A(I
where AO and Ah are given by (2) and (3). Once AOand eOare selected, W is determined by (2), and
Ah is determined according to (3). Thus, substituting (2) into (4), and integrating allows (4) to be
rewritten as
[1
(5) M= e, - ~ [G(Ah) - G(AO)]
eO, AO o
‘Itisalsopossiblethathere wernul[iple crossings. ~ese are assumedawayfor analflic convenience,
8which has f~st order conditions
[1
c ‘(eo)
(6a) ~ = l-~
[1
C(eO) dAh
[G(Ah) - G(AO)I + e. - ~ g(Ah)x = O






= [G(Ah) -G(AO)]— + co-T g(Ah)— -
1
g (A()) = o




— are derived from (2) and (3) .
aAo
From (2) and (4), it is clear that eO> C(eo)\Ao in order for the fum to make positive profits.
Using (6a) and the fact that dAh/ d e. >0, C’(co) \Ao >1.6 The lowest quality worker is forced to
produce more then the efficient amount of output because the fwm cannot discriminate between low
and high ability workers. In its attempt to set a standard high enough for the high ability workers,
it must force the low ability worker to work harder than they would optimally work. It is also true
C’(e,)(+-z > ~ ‘)




numerator is negative and the denominator is negative, me denominator is negative because the slope of R(A) is
greater than that OF W- C(e{,)/A at A =Ah (see figure 1).
9that high ability workers put forth too low an effort level.7 The choice of (eO,~ is a compromise.
It is the correct choice for almost no specific worker type. Output eOis to high for A. and too low
for Ah. Recognition of this problem pushes f~ms in the direction of performance pay. Performance
pay allows better adjustment for worker heterogeneity. Those who want to put forth higher levels
of effort receive higher compensation.




Utility under piece rate = be - K - —
A
The worker maximizes (7) by choosing e, which has fwst-order condition
C’(e) (8) ~ = b.
Define eO*as the level of output chosen by the lowest ability worker, A.*, who chooses to work.
Given (8), eO* is the solution to
‘The analysis is tedious, but similar to that given in the previous text and footnote. The logic is that if even the
highest ability worker were producing above his optimal level of effort, W could be reduced by more than the lost output
to make both worker and firm better off, But if reducing eOand Wis viable for the most able worker, it is even more
beneficial to lower ability workers, for whom higher standards impose even greater costs.
10(9) C’(eO*)/Ao* = b .
Similarly, define e~* as the output level chosen by the highest ability worker, Ah*, who
chooses to work. Given (8), e~* is the solution to
(lo) C’(e~*) /Ah* = b .
In order to fit the Safelite situation analyzed in the empirical section below, it is useful to
model the effects of switching from an hourly wage with minimum standard to a piece rate with a
minimum guarantee. As part of Safelite’s plan, it offered a guarantee at approximately the former
wage. The guarantee was coupled, presumably, with the same minimum standard of eOas before.
Thus, the plan paid W to anyone who would have earned less than W under the piece rate, but paid
the piece rate to all of those whose compensation by the piece rate formula would have exceeded W.
The scheme used is
(11) Compensation = max [W,be- fl.





This scheme is typical of many salespersons’ plans. A draw, in this case equal to W, is paid
up to some level of output. Until that t~get level is reached, the worker receives ordy W. After q*,
he begins to receive additional compensation for increases in output. Of course, this scheme charges
all workers whose output exceeds W the amount K for the job. As long as the worker produces
q>q *, his compensation is given by be - K. At most firms, workers who continually dip into their
draw by producing qeq” are likely to fmd their employment terminated after some period of time.
It is now possible to state proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Effort is does not decrease when the f~m switches horn hourly wages to piece rates,
and for high enough values of b, effort increases.
Proof Output cannot fall below eObecause of the f~m imposed constraint at eO. But output may
exceed eO if for some A, AosAsAh,
12(P1.1) W- C(eo)/A<be*(A) -K- C(e*(A))/A.
Then the worker of type A prefers to work above the level given by the guarantee. Since all workers
worked at level eO under hourly wages, output rises with piece rates for b sufficiently high to
guarantee that condition (Pl. 1) holds for some A. III
Because the guarantee binds for some workers, but not for all, effort does not increase for all
workers. Workers whose optimal level of effort by (8) lies to the left of q* in fig. 2 gain nothing by
increasing effort. But those whose optimal level of effort is sufficiently high may choose to work
enough to be on the upward sloping portion of the compensation function.
It is now possible to determine which type of worker is willing to work for the f~m under the
new compensation scheme, Recall that A. and Ah were the lower and upper cutoffs of workers under
the hourly wage. Defie the lower and upper cutoffs in the new regime as AO* and Ah *, respectively.
Let us examine the relation of AO*to A. and of Ah” to Ah. Fkst note that A. * =Ao if
(12) bee* -K- C(eo*)/Ao<W- C(eo)iAo,
here eO* was defied above as the optimal output for type A. under piece rates.
When (12) holds, all A. t~es prefer to accept the guaranteed wage of W and to work at eO.
Nothing is changed for the lowest ability individual. Since types A. do not take advantage of piece
rates, no one with A <A. wiUtake advantage of piece rates so the bottom cutoff remains unchanged. 8
‘It must be true that if A. accepts the guarantee of W, then anyone with A <A. accepts the guarantee as well.
But A. is detined as the lowest type to accept the cutoff.
13Conversely, if (12) does not hold, then A. strictly prefers the piece rate which means that rents are
positive for A. types. This implies that there exists A <A. for whom rents are zero. But A.* is
defined as the (new) type who cams zero rents at the job. Thus, when condition (12) does not hold,
AO*<AO.
Also, if
(13) beh* -K- C(eh*)/Ah> W- C(eo)/Ah,
(where e~* was defined as the optimal output for type Ah under piece rates)
then Ah* >Ah.
When condition (13) holds, the highest ability type under the hourly wage shuns the guarantee
in favor of higher effort, higher earnings piece rates. This implies that Ah now earns rents and can
no longer be the marginal worker. Then there must exist an A >Ah who is willing to work at the fum
as well. Thus, Ah* >Ah.
It is now possible to state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: A sufficient condition for the average ability of the work force to rise after the switch
to piece rates is that some workers accept the guaranteed wage and some workers choose to work
enough to k on the piece rate. In terms of figure 2, as long as there are workers whose output lies
on both sides of q*, average ability rises.
Proofi
14If any accept the wage gumantee, then surely A. accepts the guarantee. We know that AO
is willing to work for W at effort eObecause A. worked under these terms before. Furthermore,
since the guarantee
But this means that
Conversely,
has not been made any more attractive, no one with A CA. is willing to work.
condition (12) must hold, so A.* =Ao.
if any choose to work in the piece rate range, then surely the worker with the
highest ability chooses to work in this range. But the highest ability worker cannot be Ah. If Ah
chooses to work in the piece rate range, then condition (13) holds, which implies that Ah* >Ah.
It is possible, that Ah
the piece rate range.
chooses to accept the wage guarantee and another worker chooses to work in
But that worker must have A >Ah or Ah would prefer the piece rate as well,
In this case Ah>Ah *. Since A.* =Ao, and since Ah* >Ah, average ability must rise. 1II
Average ability rises because the ability of the lowest quality worker does not change as a
result of the switch in compensation scheme, but the average ability of the highest quality worker
rises. Because a piece rate allows the more able to work harder and receive more from the job, and
because the hourly wage does not, more able workers prefer piece rates. The least able worker is
indifferent ktween the two schemes. switching to piece rates has the effect of improving retention
and recruitment of high quality workers.9
Proposition 3: A sufficient condition for the variance of worker ability and output to rise after the
%e condition that some workers continue to opt for the guaranteed wage is not superfluous. Were all workers
to opt for the piece rate, then it is possible that even very low ability workers who did not work before now work for the
firm. Their addition could actually result in a lowering of average quality.
15switch to piece rates is that some workers accept the guaranteed wage and some workers choose to
work enough to be on the piece rate.
Proofi
From the proof to proposition 2, A.* =Ao and Ah* >Ah. This is sufficient to imply that
variance in ability rises. Also, since all workers choose to produce eOunder the hourly wage, but
workers who work on piece rates chooses e according to (8) under a piece rate, positive variance in
A implies positive variance in e under piece rates. Ill
Even if underlying ability levels did not change, variance in productivity would rise because
workers choose the same level of output under an hourly wage, but type-specific levels of output
under piece rates. When it is recognized that the maximum ability level increases under a piece rate,
the change in output variance becomes even greater,
Data:
Safelite Glms Corporation is located in Columbus Ohio and is the country’s largest installer
of automobile glass. Recently, Safelite, under the direction of CEO, Garen Staglin, and President,
John Barlow, instituted a new compensation scheme for the autoglass installers. Until January, 1994,
glass installers were paid an hourly wage rate, which did not vary in any direct way with the number
of windows that were installed. During 1994 and 1995, installers were shifted from an hourly wage
schedule to performance pay - specifically, to a piece rate schedule. Rather than being paid for the
number of hours that they worked, installers were now paid for the number of glass units that they
installed. The rates vmied somewhat, on average installers were paid $20 per unit installed. At the
time that the piece rates were instituted, the workers were also given a guarantee of approximately
16$11 per hour. If their weekly pay came out to less than the guarantee, they would be paid the
guaranteed amount. Many workers ended up in the guarantee range.
Safelite has a very sophisticated computerized information system, which keeps track of how
many units of each kind that each installer in the company installed in a given week. For the purposes
here, monthly data were used. Since PPP (performance pay plan) was phased in over the 18 month
period, most workers were employed under both regimes. Thus, data on individual output are
available for most installers both during the hourly wage period and during the PPP period. This
before-and-tier comparison with person spectilc
which to base an analysis of performance pay.
Some basic characteristics of the sample
data provides a very clean body of information on
are reported in table 1. The data are organized as
follows. Each month provides an independent unit of observation. There are 38,764 person months
of data covering a 19 month period. Thus, there are 38764/19 or 2040 workers employed during
the average month. Over the 19 month period, there was a total of 3707 different individuals who
worked for Stielite as installers, called “associates.” The number of “good” observationsis31, 104
when partial months are dropped from the data set.
There are a number of possible productivity measures. The one that most Safelite managers
look to is UAD, or units-per-associate-per-day. This is the total number of glass units per 8 hour
day that are installed by a given associate. The UAD number for each individual observation relates
to a given associate in a given month. Thus, UAD is the average number of units per 8 hour period
instaLled by the given associate during the given month.
The average number of glass units installed per day over the entire period is 2.96, with a
standard deviation of 1,53. Under the PPP formula, the average worker would have earned $1711
17if ordy the PPP formula were used. In actuality, the average actual pay was $2250. The difference
reflects vacation, holiday and sick pay, as well as two other factors. First, not all workers are on PPP
during the period. When on hourly wages, some received higher compensation than they would have
had they been on PPP, given the number of units installed. Of course, when a given worker switches
to PPP, incentives change and his output may go up enough to cover the deficit. Second, even when
workers are on PPP, a substantial fraction of person weeks calculated on the basis of the PPP formula
come in below the guaranteed weekly compensation. The guarantee binds for those worker weeks
and actual pay then exceeds PPP pay. In all months after the introduction of PPP, at least some
workers received the guaranteed pay and some earned more than the guarantee. Thus, the sufficient




PPPFLAG a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is
on PPP during that month
BASERATE Hourly wage
UAD Units per associate per day, Average number
of units of glass installed by the given
associate during the month in question.
REGHOURS Regular hours worked
OVTHRS Overtime hours worked
SICKHRS Number of hours of paid sick time
SICKPAY Average amount paid in sick benefits
ACTPAY Pay actually received in a given month
PPPPAY Pay earned by the straight PPP formula; if
there were no guaranteed wage, this, plus
compensation for non-worked time, would
equal actual pay for those person-months with
PPPFLAG= 1
PAYPRDAY Pay-per-day: Actual pay per eight hours
worked = t
CSTPU Cost-per-unit: ACTPAY for a given worker,
divided by the number of units installed by
that worker in a given month
LNPAYDAY Log (PAYPRDAY)

















There were 3707 individuals who worked as installers over the 19 month period covered
by the data. The unit of analysis is a person-month. There are 31,104 person-months of
good data. PAYPRDAY is calculated only for workers whose total hours in a month
exceeded 10 and CSTPU only for workers whose monthly units installed exceeded 3.
19Means for actual and PPP pay reveal almost nothing about the effects of PPP on performance
and sorting. A more direct approach is needed, Table 2 presents some means of the key variables
and breaks them down by PPPFLAG, a dummy set equal to 1 if the worker in question is on PPP
during the given month, 10
Table 2
Means of Key Variables by Pay Structure
PPPFLAG=O (Hourly Wages) PPPFLAG= 1 (Piece rates)
Number of Ohs. 13850 15,691
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
UAD 2.69 1.41 3.23 1.58
SICKHRS 0.60 3.0 0.25 1.98
ACTPAY $2226 $800 $2279 $951
PPPPAY $1575 $822 $1841 $998
CSTPU $44.48 $74.95 $35.23 $48.56
Note: 1563 observations were dropped because the individual spent part of the month on PPP and part on hourly wages.
The story that will be told in more detail below shows up in the simple means. The average
level of UAD is about .54 units, or 20% higher in the piece rate regime than in the hourly wage
regime. Also, the variance in output goes up when switching from hourly wages to piece rates, as
can be seen by comparing the standard deviations of 1.58 to 1.41. Thus, propositions 1, 2 and 3,
which state that both mean and variance in output rise when switching from hourly wages to piece
rates are borne out by the simple statistics.
profitability went up significantly with the switch.
Further, note that there is a good indication that
The cost per unit is considerably lower in the piece
‘“Only observations where workers were on one pay regime or the other for the full month are used. Partial
month observations are deleted.
20rate regime than it is with hourly wages. 11
The simple statistics do not take other factors into account. In particular, autoglass demand
is closely related to miles driven, which varies with weather. Major storms also cause glass damage.
Month effects and year effects matter. Perhaps more important, the management change that took
place before PPP was instituted had other direct effects on the company as well that may have
changed output during the sample period, irrespective of the switch to PPP. To deal with these
factors, row 1 of table 3 reports the coefficients from a regression of the log of UAD month and year
dummies. The coefficient on PPPFLAG is .36, indicating that there is a 36% gain in productivity as
measured by UAD associated with a move to PPP.
There are three possible interpretations of this extremely large and statistically precise effect.
First, the gain in productivity may result from incentive effects associated with the program. Second,
the gain may result from sorting. A different group of workers may be present after the switch to
piece rates. Third, the pattern of implementation may cause a spurious positive effect. Suppose that
Stielite picked its best workers to put on piece rates first. The PPPFLAG coefficient would pickup
an ability effect because high ability workers would have more PPP months than low ability workers.
These three effects can all be identified by using the data in a variety of ways.
1‘The fact that actual pay has only risen slightly after the switch to PPP than before reflects the phase in pattern
of the PPP program. Lower wage areas were brought into the program first, which means that the PPP= I data are
dominated by lower wage markets,
21Table 3
Regression Results
Dependent Variable: In (UAD) Independent Variable: PPPFLAG plus dummies
Nl]mb.r of ~hservations: q 1.104 . .. .... . . -. ----- .—------ --, ---
Reg. Coeff. on Coeff. Coeff. r- Description
# PPPFLAG on TENUR on sqr.
PPPTENUR
1 .36 .04 Dummies for month and year
(.01) included
2 .20 ,76 Dummies for month and year;
(.01) worker specific dummies included
(318 1 individual workers)
3 .29 .10 .26 ,04 Dummies for month and year
(.01) (.02) (.02) included.
“,. ,. . . . .. Pr. ,
Stanaara errors are reported m parentheses t)elow tne coerrlclents.
Regression 1 hm a coefficient on PPPFLAG of .36. When worker dummies are included, the
coefficient drops to .20. Still, .20 is a huge number and is the pure incentive effect that results from
switching from hourly wages to piece rates. A given worker installs 20% more units after the switch
to PPP than he did before the switch to PPP. This estimate controls for month and year effects.
There is no interpretation of the PPPF’LAG coefficient in regression 2 other than the incentive one.
Individual ability is held constant m is location by including the person dummies. Approximately 5/9
of the 36% difference in productivity attributed to the PPP program reflects an incentive effect.
Nor does this gain appear to be a “Hawthorne effect.”12 This can be seen by examining
regression 3 in table 3. The variable, ‘TENUR”, is not actual years of tenure in the firm because the
true start date is unavailable. But TENUR does measure the passage of time in the f~m. Specifically,
it is defined as the time since either the beginning of the sample period, i.e., January, 1994, or the
‘zThe Hawthorne effect, which many now dispute, alleges that any change is likely to bring about short term
gains in productivity.
22worker’s start date, whichever is later. Thus, if the worker had started sometime before January,
1994, tenure in July, 1994 would be .5. If the worker had started in April, 1994, then tenure in July,
1994 would be .25. The coefficient on TENUR differs from true tenure effects only to the extent that
nonlirtearities Me important. The variable, “PPPTENUR” is defined as the number of years since the
worker was switched horn hourly wage to piece rate, times PPPFLAG. For example, a worker who
started 1994 on hourly wages and was switched to PPP on July 1, 1994 would have PPPTENUR=O
for the June, 1994 observation, .5 for the January, 1995 observation, and 1.0 for the June, 1995
observation.
Tenure effects Me Itige and sigtilcant. One year of experience raises productivity by about
10%.13More interesting, perhaps, is the effect of time on the PPP program. The coefficient of .26
on PPPTENUR, coupled with a PPPFLAG coefficient of .29, means that the initial effect of switching
from hourly wage to piece rate is to increase productivity by 29%. Mer one year on the program,
the increase in productivity has grown to .29 + .26 or 55Y0. The Hawthorne effect would imply a
negative coefficient on PPPTENUR. If the Hawthorne effect held, then the longer the worker were
on the progr~ the smaller would be the effect of piece rates on productivity. The reverse happens
here. Mer workers are switched to piece rates, they seem to learn ways to work faster or harder as
time progresses. 14
‘qNote that these estimates do not take out person effects so a significant part of the effect probably reflects
sorting. nose who are not making it get fired or quite, It is impossible to hold month, year, and tenure effects constant
and to allow for individual effects since the individual dummy would remove any effect of start da[e,
14Analternative is that the sorting effects mentioned in the previous footnote become more pronounced under a
piece rate system and that PPPTENUR reflecrs the differential sorting rate under the PPP program.
23Sorting:
The theory stated in propositions 2 and 3 suggests that the optimal piece rate is implemented
such that both mean and variance of worker ability should rise after the switch to piece rates. The
theory implies spectilcally that there should be no change in the number of low ability workers who
are willing to work with the f~m, but that piece rates would allow high ability workers to use their
talents more lucratively. Thus, the top tail of the distribution should thicken.
Underlying ability is dfilcult to measure, but actual output can be observed. Suppose that
workers must try the job for awhile to discover their ability levels. Workers who fmd the job
unsuitable leave. Thus, lootig at the relation of ability to separation rates before and after the switch
to piece rates will provide evidence on the validity of propositions 2 and 3.
A separation is defined as an observation such that the worker in question did not work during
the subsequent month. Thus, SEPAR is a dummy equal to 1 in the last month during which the
worker was employed. Those workers who work through July, 1995 (the last month for which data
are available) have SEPAR=O for every month in which they worked. A worker who was employed
say from January, 1994 through February, 1995 would have SEPAR=O in every month of
employment, except for February, 1995, when SEPAR would equal 1.
Table 4 reports the results of logits with SEPAR as the dependent variable. First note that
the effect of PPPFLAG is positive. Converted to probabilities, it implies that the move to PPP
increases turnover by about 7/10 of a percentage point per month, or about 20% of the turnover rate.
This is not surprising. A major change in the pay system may make some of the incumbents unhappy
enough to leave. Given the guarantee, it is more likely that the change in the pay structure signaled
tougher times ahead for low ability workers. Alternatively, the f~m may have become less tolerant
24of workers at the bottom end who constantly were paid more than the PPP calculation would imply.
Second, the coefficient on UAD is negative. More able workers are less likely to separate from the
ftrm, probably reflecting the f~m’s happiness with more productive workers.
How does the PPP program sort workers? Does it induce the least able to stay and the most
able to go? The answer is contained in logit 2 of table 4. There, an interaction effect is included.
If the PPP plan induces the least able to leave and the most able to stay, then the coefficient on
(UAD)( PPPFLAG) should k negative. In all specflcations tried, the coefficient on this interaction
was negative.
This is precisely what theory predicts. The most able were the least happy with the hourly
wage structure. A switch to piece rates keeps reduces the turnover rate of high productivity workers
relative to that of low productivity workers. The effect of PPP on turnover varies substantially with
the worker’s productivity level. At UAD=4.4, which is about the 90th percentile of worker
productivity, an additional unit of UAD is associated with an incremental decline in the turnover rate
from switching to PPP of about 1.4 percentage points, which is over one third of the monthly
turnover rate.
25Table 4
Logits of SEPAR on Productivity Measures
Number of observations: 38764
All bgits Include Month and Year Dummies
Logit # PPPFLAG UAD UAD2 UAD* Log
PPPFLAG Like-
lihood
1 .201 -.111 -4568
(.091) (.022)
2 .460 -.129 .009 -.092 -4566
(.147) (.043) (.003) (.043)
The effect of differential changes in turnover rates, hiring policy and incentives can be
summarized in the following histograms. Figure 3 shows a histogram of productivity in January, 1994
when all workers were being paid hourly wages. Figure 4 shows [he histogram in June, 1995 when
all were on PPP. The ms in the later histogram lies to the right of the earlier one. In January, 1994,
the modal worker produced between 2 and 3 units per day. In June, 1995, the modal worker












The theory taken literally implies that the average ability of workers hired after the switch to
piece rates should be higher than the average ability of those hired before the switch. While ability
cannot be observed, output can. Average output is used as a proxy for ability. For each worker, ~,
the worker specific average output under piece rates, is computed. The sample is split into those who
were hired into the piece rate regime and those who were hired before piece rates took effect. The
man level of post-piece rate output among those hired when hourly wages were in effect was 3.17.
The mean among those hired after the piece rate came into effect was only 3.00.
The fact that average output is higher among those hired under the hourly wage regime is not
surprising. Earlier hires have higher levels of tenure. Given that the effect of tenure on productivityy
for piece rate workers is 36% per year (according to table 3), and given that the post-piece rate hires
have ordy 5% lower productivity than pre-piece rate hires, the tenure effect is likely to account for
more than the difference between groups, suggesting that the post-piece rate hires are more
productive, tenure adjusted.
Profitability:
Table 2 reported that the cost per unit was lower under piece rates than under hourly wages.
But it is possible to analyze the change in profits somewhat more systematically. After all, moving
to piece rates would not be desirable from the fwms point of view if more than the increase in
productivity were eaten up by increased compensation costs.
In fact, the reverse was true by a sigtilcant margin. A regression of the log of pay per day
on PPPFLAG was run, holding year and month constant. This regression is identical to regression
1 of table 3, except that log of pay rather than log of output is the dependent variable. The coefficient
28on PPPFLAG is .066 with a standard error of .005. Recall that the total effect on worker
productivity was .36 (from table 3). Thus, there is a 36% increase in productivity per worker, but
only a 6.5% increase in wage cost. This reflects two factors. First, not all of the gains were given
to the existing work force. They were shared: As will be seen below, half went to the existing
workers and half went to the ti Second, the group of workers who are on board when piece rates
are paid are more cost effective than the group of workers who were on board when hourly wages
were paid. In l~ge part, this reflects higher levels of productivity for the typical worker in the piece
rate regime, which reduces costs per worker. Low productivity, high hourly wage workers have been
replaced by higher productivity, primarily piece rate workers.
This can be seen in more detail by holding person effects constant. A regression was run,
with the log of pay per day as dependent variable, on PPPFLAG including person, year and month
durnrnies. The regression is identical to the previous one except that individual constant terms are
included. It is also identical to regression 2 of table 3, except that log of pay rather than log of
output is the dependent variable. The coefficient on PPPFLAG is .096 with a standard error of .004.
Thus, pay went up for a given employee by 9.6% on average after PPP was instituted. But table 3
shows that productivity for a given worker incre&ed by 20Y0, which means that incumbents captured
about half of the return to the increase in their own productivity.
Did profits rise? This depends on the increase in productivity relative to the increase in labor
and other costs. Given the numbers (36Y0 increase in productivityy, 6.690 increase in wages), it is
ufiely that other variable costs of production (most importantly the glass and transportation costs)
ate up the margin still given to the f~m. The piece rate plan seems to have been implemented in a
29way that likely made both capital and labor better off. 15
There is one cost that has been ignored throughout. Piecework requires measurement of
output. In Safelite’s case, the measurement comes about through a very sophisticated computerized
system. But the system involves people and machines that are costly. Indeed, in equilibrium, f~ms
that pay hourly wages or monthly salaries are probably those for whom measurement costs exceed
the benefits from switching to output based pay.
In this case, the gains in productivity were very large. Further, the information systems were
initially put irt place for reasons other than monitoring worker productivity, having to do with
inventory control and reduced installation lags. The economies of scope in information technology,
coupled with the labor productivity gains, ue probably large enough to cover whatever additional
cost of monitoring was involved. This is not always so. Whenever a fwm switches from one pay
system to another, it is almost certain that one system does not maximize profit. But Safelite has no
apparent desire to return to the previous pay system.
Sick Leave:
Units-per-associate-per-day are only one measure of productivity. Other measures are
available. One that is of interest is paid sick time. To the extent that workers can earn more by
coming 12towork than by taking the default sick day compensation, PPP created incentives for
workers to spend more time on the job and less time taking paid sick leave. Indeed, the mean level
of paid sick hours fell by almost 60% after PPP was instituted. Most of this effect took the form of
ls~e firm’s earnings are up substantially since the switch to piece rates, but this could retlect other factors as
well.
30sorting. There was virtually no effect of PPP on sick hours, once person dummies were included.
Virtually all of the effect resulted from turnover. Workers who were most likely to take sick leave
left and those who were least likely to take sick leave were hired. These effects, while sign~lcant,
are not particulwly important to the company because a small fraction of the workforce is eligible for
sick pay.
Quality:
One defect of paying piece rates is that quality may suffer. 16In the Safelite case, most quality
problems show up rather quickly in the form of broken windshields. Since the guilty installer can be
easily identified, there is an efficient solution to the quality problem The installer must reinstall the
windshield on his own time and must pay the company for the replacement glass before any paying
jobs are assigned to him. This induces the installer to take the appropriate amount of care when
installing the glass in the f~st place.
Safelite uses another system that relies on peer pressure. 17 When a customer reports a defect,
the job is randomly assigned to a worker in the shop that was responsible for the problem. The
worker is not paid for doing the repair work. But workers know the identity of the initial installer.
If one installer causes his peers to engage in too many re-dos, his co-workers pressure him to improve
or resign.
Implications:
The results imply that productivity effects associated with the switch from hourly wages to
piece rates Me quite large, The theory implies that a switch should bring about an increase in average
“See bzear (1986) and Baker (1992).
“See Kandel and Lazear (1992) for a discussion of the effects of peer pressure and norms in an organization.
31levels ofoutput andin itsvariance. These predictions are borne out. Thetheory does notirnply that
profits must rise. Mwket equilibrium is characterized by fwms that choose a variety of compensation
methods. Firms choose the compensation scheme by comparing the costs and benefits of each
scheme. The benefit is a productivity gain. Costs may be associated with measurement difficulties,
undesirable risk transfers, and quality declines.
It is interesting that the productivity gains are so large for this particular firm. Of course, this
is only one data point and it is one where the case for piece rates seems especially strong. Output is
easily measured and quality problems are detected and blame is assignable. Managerial and
professional jobs may not be as well suited to piecework. The fact that the productivity gains are so
large in this case is worthy of attention. The results do not imply that all f~ms should switch to piece
rate pay.
Summary and Conclusion:
The theory above reveals average output per worker and average worker ability should rise
when a f~m switches from hourly wages to piece rates. The hum level of ability does not
change, but more able workers, who shunned the hourly wage, are attracted by piece rates. As a
result of incentive effects, average output per worker rises. Thus, average ability and output, as well
as variance in ability and output, should rise when a f~m switches from hourly wages to piece rates.
The effects of changing compensation method were estimated using worker level monthly
output data from Safelite Autoglass Company. The theory is borne out almost to the letter. Moving
to a piece rate regime is wsociated with a 36% increase in productivity for the company as a whole.
Part of the gain reflects sorting, part reflects incentives, and some reflects the pattern in which the
scheme was implemented. For a given individual, switching to piece rates increased productivity by
32about 2070.
Tenure effects associated with productivity are large. The average worker’s productivity
increased by 36% in one year after piece rate pay was adopted.
Turnover rates rise after the change in compensation method, but the pattern of turnover is
in direct support of the theory. There is a general increase in turnover of all groups, except for the
most able. Piece rates appeal to the most able, but are less attractive to other groups of workers.
As a result, coupled with a wage guarantee, the result of the switch to piece rate pay is increased
heterogeneity, both in output and ability.
An analysis of paid sick leave reveals that piece rate pay reduced the amount of paid sick
leave, probably because piece rates increase the relative cost of taking sick leave.
Workers captured some of the return Ii-em moving to piece rates. The average incumbent
worker’s wages rose by 9.6% as a result of the switch. This accounts for about half of the gain in
productivity for the given worker. No data on the costs of implementing the program are available,
but is unlikely that in this instance the costs swamp the huge productivity gains associated with
moving to piece rates.
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